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We investigate the relationship between pension fund governance and investment performance.
For this purpose, we develop the Swiss Pension Fund Governance Index (SPGI) which is a
standard metric for the governance quality of Swiss pension funds. The empirical analysis is
based on a sample of 96 pension funds with total assets of more than CHF 190 billion. We ﬁnd
evidence for governance issues in the area organization and target setting. Our results support
the widespread hypothesis of a positive relationship between pension fund governance and
investment performance.
1 Introduction
A few cases of mismanagement and fraud in the Swiss occupational pension scheme
have put pension fund governance in the spotlight of public interest. Pension fund
governance has taken center stage in public debate also in other countries like
Germany, the Netherlands or the UK.1 The public and political debate on pension
fund governance is often centered around the misuse of pension assets. However,
pension fund governance has a much broader scope and includes overall manage-
ment, organizational design and decision-making processes. Taking such a holistic
view, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has
adopted guidelines for pension fund governance in April 2005 (OECD, 2002). The
guidelines contain 12 fundamental principles and aim at setting international stan-
dards for the governance of corporate pension funds. In Switzerland, the Swiss
Pension Fund Association (ASIP) and the Swiss Insurance Association (SVV)
adopted a code of conduct already in the year 2000. However, the code of conduct
conﬁnes itself to preventing the misuse of pension assets.
We would like to thank Alexander Ising, Stephan Su¨ss and Evert Wipplinger for their helpful comments.
1 Myners (2001) investigates institutional investments in the UK and sets out ten principles of good
practice.
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Previous research is mainly dedicated to theoretical best practice solutions and
concepts for the governance of pension fund. Ambachtsheer and Ezra (1998) and
Ambachtsheer (2007) provide a comprehensive governance framework for US pen-
sion funds. Brandenberger and Hilb (2008) describe a holistic and practical govern-
ance framework for Swiss pension funds. In contrast, empirical research on the
relation between pension fund governance and investment performance is scarce.
Ambachtsheer, Capelle, and Scheibelhut (1998) ﬁnd a positive correlation between
governance quality and pension fund performance. However, they use a subjective
governance metric that is based on the governance quality perceived by pension fund
chief executive oﬃcers (CEOs).
In this paper, we develop a standardized and objective metric that measures the
quality of a pension fund’s governance. For this purpose, we construct a governance
index for Swiss pension funds. The Swiss Pension Fund Governance Index (SPGI)
relates to the most recent research on the governance of pension funds as well as the
current standards and best practice codes such as the OECD guidelines for pension
fund governance. Applying the SPGI, we investigate the current governance quality
of Swiss pension funds. We conduct a survey among 500 Swiss pension funds and
determine the SPGI value for each individual pension fund. Finally, we test for any
statistical relationship between governance quality, measured by the SPGI, and the
investment performance of pension funds.
The article is structured as follows: in Section 2, we review the previous research on
pension fund governance. Section 3 provides a brief description of legal requirements
relevant to pension fund governance. In Section 4, we develop and describe the SPGI.
Section 5 provides an initial overview and characterization of our data sample and
provides an assessment of the current pension fund governance quality in
Switzerland. The empirical results on the relation between pension fund governance
and investment returns are presented in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 draws the ﬁnal
conclusions.
2 The literature
While literature on corporate governance has proliferated in recent years, the
governance of pension funds has attracted less attention. The majority of the existing
literature on pension fund governance is dedicated to the development and descrip-
tion of best practice solutions and concepts for pension funds. In contrast, there is
only limited empirical research on the relation between governance and performance
of pension funds.
Ambachtsheer, Capelle, and Scheibelhut (1998) and Ambachtsheer and Ezra
(1998) were among the ﬁrst to investigate the statistical relationship between
governance quality and investment performance. They develop a questionnaire that
asks pension fund CEOs to score statements about their governance quality. The
authors report a positive correlation between the resulting ‘CEO score ’ and invest-
ment performance. Ambachtsheer, Capelle, and Lum (2007) and Ambachtsheer
(2007) corroborate these ﬁndings with a newer data sample. According to their
analysis, the impact of governance from good to bad may be as much as 100 to 300
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basis points per year. However, the ﬁndings are subject to some important caveats.
The proxy for the governance quality, the ‘CEO score’, is based on self-reported
scores. It remains unclear whether the causality runs from the perceived governance
quality to investment performance. It could also be the other way around with good
(bad) achieved investment performance leading to perceived good (bad) governance
quality. Thus, the perceived governance quality does not necessarily correlate posi-
tively with the eﬀective governance quality. Finally, there is a tendency in surveys of
this nature to rate on the high side. As a result, the ‘CEO score’ is likely to give a
biased view of the eﬀective quality of pension fund governance.
Some authors investigate how the investment performance of pension funds is
related to particular governance variables such as the composition of the board of
trustees. Yang and Mitchell (2005) investigate the eﬀect of several organizational and
structural pension fund features on the investment performance. They ﬁnd evidence
that the composition of the board of trustees as well as the reporting practices inﬂu-
ence the investment performance of public pension funds. Mitchell and Hsin (1994)
conﬁrm that the composition of public pension fund boards is signiﬁcantly associated
with performance. Useem and Mitchell (2000), in contrast, ﬁnd no direct relation
between the governance quality and the investment performance. However, they
show that governance has a direct eﬀect on how pension funds invest their assets. The
investment strategy, in turn, directly aﬀects the investment performance. The authors
conclude that governance quality indirectly aﬀects the investment performance of
pension funds. Finally, Besley and Prat (2003) apply agency theory to ﬁnd the opti-
mal governance structure of deﬁned contribution and deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans.
They analytically prove that pension fund governance matters.
Due to the lack of a standardized and objective metric that measures the govern-
ance quality of pension funds as well as the lack of data, many authors conﬁne
themselves to developing best practice recommendations for pension fund govern-
ance without providing empirical evidence. Ambachtsheer and Ezra (1998),
Ambachtsheer (2007) and Brandenberger and Hilb (2008) provide comprehensive
governance frameworks for US and Swiss pension funds. They cover all aspects of
pension fund governance such as organizational coherence, staﬀ performance
evaluation, investment controlling and communication. The OECD guidelines for
pension fund governance are less concrete and practical. In return, the 12-point
guidelines are not country-speciﬁc and mark therefore the ﬁrst initiative to set inter-
national standards for the governance of pension funds. The guidelines propose a
governance structure with shared responsibility and built-in checks and balances,
such as regular reviews by an independent party. Clapman (2007) identiﬁes several
governance-related problems in US pension funds and recommends best practice
governance principles to deal with them. He provides recommendations for an opti-
mal board composition and proposes clear lines of authority as well as regular staﬀ
performance evaluations. Board composition and its decision-making capacity are
also seen as crucial by Clark, Caerlewy-Smith, and Marshall (2006, 2007). Finally,
Clark and Urwin (2007) propose 12 principles of best practice such as organizational
coherence, eﬀective and performance-linked compensation practices and decision-
making systems that function in real time, not calendar time.
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In summary, it can be highlighted that previous research provides some evidence
that good governance positively aﬀects the investment performance of pension funds.
3 Legal requirements relevant to pension fund governance
In this section, we brieﬂy describe the most important legal requirements aﬀecting the
governance of Swiss pension funds.2 Switzerland is one of the few countries with a
mandatory occupational pension scheme. The aﬃliation of employees with a pension
plan is the responsibility of the employer. Since employees do not have the right to
opt out of a pension fund and can exert little inﬂuence on the details of their pension
insurance, the Swiss Federal Law on Occupational Old-age, Survivors’ and Disability
Pension Plan (LPP) deﬁnes minimum standards to ensure a certain minimum beneﬁt
level. Furthermore, the law stipulates that pension funds must be legally separated
from the sponsoring company.
To ensure a minimum beneﬁt level, the LPP stipulates minimum contributions that
vary according to age. Furthermore, Swiss pension funds have to guarantee a certain
minimum return on the mandatory savings capital of active contributors on a yearly
basis. In addition, the LPP stipulates a minimum conversion rate, with which the
individual savings capital is converted into an annual pension annuity for deﬁned
contribution plans. The liabilities are not only determined by the statutory minimum
interest rate but also by the so-called technical interest rate. The technical interest rate
is the assumed discount rate used for the calculation of the present value of future
contributions and liabilities.3 As a result, a deﬁned contribution plan has to guarantee
the statutory minimum interest rate on the savings capital of the active contributors
and, as an implicit guarantee, the technical interest rate on the pensioners’ covering
capital. A deﬁned beneﬁt plan has to implicitly guarantee the technical interest rate
both to the active contributors and the pensioners. Considering administration costs
and provisions for longevity and value ﬂuctuation reserves, an average Swiss pension
fund currently requires an annual investment return between 4 and 5% to keep its
ﬁnancial balance.4
In most cases, Swiss pension funds are governed by a board of trustees that is
ultimately responsible for managing and overseeing the pension fund in the best
interests of plan members and beneﬁciaries. The board of trustees is able to delegate
certain functions, for example, to a CEO or to sub-committees. However, the ulti-
mate management and oversight responsibility cannot be delegated but remains
always with the board of trustees. It must be pointed out that board members are
personally liable for any losses and damages caused willfully.
According to the LPP, employees and employers must have equal representation in
the board of trustees. In Switzerland, as in many other countries, there is no legal
requirement for board members to have any particular level of expertise such as
know-how in investment matters. In addition, the selection process for board
2 See Helbling (2006) for a more detailed description of the Swiss occupational pension scheme.
3 The Pension Rights Transfer Act stipulates a technical interest rate between 3.5 and 4.5%.
4 Estimate is based on the following assumptions: statutory minimum interest rate of 2.5% on the savings
capital of active contributors, technical interest rate of 3.75% on the pensioners’ covering capital,
provisions for longevity and ﬂuctuation reserves of 0.5% in each case and administration costs of 0.3%.
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members is not regulated by the LPP. While there is no empirical evidence on the
level of competence of Swiss pension fund trustees, Myners (2001) points to signiﬁ-
cant shortcomings in the knowledge and understanding of pension fund trustees in
the UK.
The LPP contains regulations to which Swiss pension funds must comply for
their investments. Pension fund assets have to be managed prudently to ensure the
safety of assets, achieve a reasonable return on investments, maintain a suitable di-
versiﬁcation of risks and allow for the liquidity requirements of the plan.5 To comply
with the ‘safety principle ’, pension funds invest their assets in such a way that
liabilities are covered preferably any time.6 For this purpose, most pension funds
accumulate variability reserves which help to smoothen out ﬂuctuations on invest-
ment returns. In addition, Swiss pension funds face quantitative limitations on their
investments in equities, bonds, mortgages and real estate. Since the year 2000, it has
become clear that quantitative limitations can be exceeded if the pension fund can
justify them as part of a prudent investment policy according to Article 59 of the
Ordinance on the Occupational Old-Age, Survivors’ and Disability Beneﬁt Plans
(OOB2). Recent surveys7 uncover that almost 80% of Swiss pension funds utilize the
prudent investor rule and exemptions from the quantitative limitations thus have
become the rule.
4 SPGI
In this section, we develop a standard metric that measures the governance quality of
Swiss pension funds. For this purpose, we construct the SPGI. The SPGI is based on
empirical ﬁndings of previous research, best practice solutions and concepts proposed
in the literature, and own considerations of the authors. The index takes values be-
tween 0 and 65 points with better-governed pension funds having higher index levels.
The SPGI consists of six sub-indices capturing the governance quality with regard to
organization (10 points), target setting and management objectives (10), investment
strategy (9), investment rules and organization (7), controlling and steering (26), and
communication (3). To ensure easy application of the SPGI, we constrain ourselves
to objective and measurable index constituents. However, we are well aware that
good governance includes soft factors that are not considered in our index. We
describe the composition of each of the six SPGI sub-indices in the following
sub-sections.
4.1 Organization
The SPGI Organization, the SPGI sub-index measuring the organizational design
quality, takes values between 0 and 10. Table 1 provides the detailed composition of
the ﬁrst SPGI sub-index.
5 Article 71 of the Swiss Federal Law on Occupational Old-age, Survivors’ and Disability Pension Plan
(LPP). In addition, Articles 49–60 of the Ordinance on the Occupational Old-age, Survivors’ and
Disability Beneﬁt Plans (OOB2).
6 The Swiss regulator temporarily tolerates underfunding of pension funds to a level of 90%.
7 Compare the 8th edition of the Swiss Institutional Survey (Lusenti, 2007).
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Clear lines of authority minimize misunderstandings and give rise to an eﬃcient
decision-making process. Clapman (2007) and Clark and Urwin (2007) conﬁrm that
clear lines of authority are a principal component of good governance. Similarly, the
OECD guidelines postulate clear identiﬁcation and assignment of responsibilities. To
comply with good governance, pension funds therefore require organizational regu-
lations (index point 1) that clearly identify and assign the most important areas of
responsibilities to the diﬀerent pension fund bodies. In addition, we concur with
Brandenberger and Hilb (2008) and state that the most important responsibilities
should be detailed in a function chart (2).8
Recent developments in the capital markets reveal that pension funds require
decision-making systems that function in real time, not in calendar time, as pointed
out by Clark and Urwin (2007). To ensure a qualiﬁed real-time decision-making
process, it is recommended that pension funds install a full-time CEO (3). Thus,
day-to-day management and, in particular, routine controlling duties can be del-
egated to the CEO. We are aware that small and even medium-sized pension funds
may potentially be unable to aﬀord a full-time CEO on their payroll. In such a case,
pension funds could consider outsourcing day-to-day management to an external
provider. Alternatively, members of the board of trustees could specialize in certain
Table 1. Composition of the sub-index SPGI Organization
The SPGI consists of six sub-indices. The sub-index SPGI Organization takes values between 0
and 10 with better-governed pension funds having higher values. The sub-index measures the
governance quality with regard to organization based on ten objective and measurable criteria.
Best practice Assessment criteria SPGI







Separate investment committee 1
Number of board members equal to or less than 6 1











Direct access to external
know-how
Immediate access of the board to external specialist(s) 1




8 A function chart shows the diﬀerent management levels of a pension fund (e.g. board of trustees,
investment committee and, CEO) and their relation (e.g. decision, implementation and control) to
individual tasks and competences.
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areas such as beneﬁts, investments and legal requirements to ensure qualiﬁed and
eﬀective decision-making.9
Hess and Impavido (2003) argue that boards of corporations not only divide their
work but also assign responsibility for such work to separate committees. We believe
that pension funds should set up at least one sub-committee responsible for invest-
ment matters (4) such as the selection of external asset managers or decisions on the
tactical asset allocation. The investment committee may meet more frequently than
the board of trustees thus enabling fast decision-making processes. Furthermore, the
appointment of investment committee members can be solely based on expertise since
equal representation of employers and employees is in Switzerland only required for
the board of trustees.
Corporate governance research suggests that large boards can be less eﬀective than
smaller boards. Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) ﬁnd a negative size eﬀect
in boards of seven or more members. Yermack (1996) corroborates these ﬁndings.
For pension funds, Impavido (2002) postulates that the number of board members
should be limited to maximize the eﬀectiveness of the board. We believe that cor-
porate governance research is applicable to pension funds. Therefore, the SPGI re-
wards pension funds with boards (5) and investment committees (6) consisting of not
more than six members.
Board composition is perceived as one of the key issues by many authors (e.g.,
Ambachtsheer (2007), Clark (2007) and Clark, Caerlewy-Smith, and Mar-shall
(2007)). To comply with good governance, a board of trustees must consist of
adequately qualiﬁed and experienced individuals. However, since all stakeholders
such as employers, unions and old age beneﬁciaries wish to be represented in the
board of trustees, there is a natural trade-oﬀ between representation and expertise.
We agree with Clark, Caerlewy-Smith, and Mar-shall (2007) and postulate that
members of the board of trustees should be solely selected for their expertise.
Therefore, the SPGI rewards pension funds that have no ex oﬃcio members in their
board of trustees (7). Furthermore, trustees, on a regular basis, should obtain edu-
cational training with a view to providing and improving core competencies of im-
portance for pension fund management. Therefore, we postulate that pension funds
should have a concept on educational training (8).
In case the board of trustees or the investment committee does not have the suf-
ﬁcient expertise, direct access to external know-how is of great importance. This is
supported by the OECD guidelines and by Clark, Caerlewy-Smith, and Marshall
(2007). Therefore, our governance index rewards pension funds that have indepen-
dent experts in their board of trustees (9) and in their investment committee (10).
4.2 Target setting and management objectives
The second SPGI sub-index, the SPGI Target Setting, measures the governance
quality with regard to target setting and management objectives. It takes values
between 0 and 10 index points, as shown in Table 2.
9 If there is no CEO, specialization of the board of trustees gives 0.5 index points.
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The ultimate goal of a pension fund is to provide a secure retirement income to its
plan members. To be able to achieve the ultimate goal, there should be clear trans-
parency on the target of ﬁnancing. This implies that pension funds have transparency
on the minimum return that is required to keep their ﬁnancial balance (index point 1).
The estimate of the minimum required return net of asset management costs should
at least consider guaranteed interest on pension liabilities, longevity risk, accumu-
lation of value ﬂuctuation reserves10 and administration costs (2). Since all of these
parameters can change over time, the minimum required return needs to be reviewed
at least on an annual basis (3) according to Brandenberger and Hilb (2008).
The OECD guidelines propose regular assessments of persons involved in the op-
eration and oversight of the pension funds. However, regular assessments require
measurable management objectives. Therefore, the SPGI rewards pension funds with
binding objectives for the board of trustees (4). Hess and Impavido (2003) provide
examples of potential board objectives such as improvement of the funding ratio, size
of the investment return, and reducing administration costs. In addition, a job de-
scription (5) deﬁning general tasks, functions and responsibilities is recommended for
the CEO. Based on the job description, the pension fund should deﬁne binding
objectives for the CEO preferably on a yearly basis (6).
Management objectives alone are not suﬃcient to encourage good decision-
making. In line with the OECD guidelines, we believe that target-oriented incentive
Table 2. Composition of the sub-index SPGI Target Setting
The SPGI consists of six sub-indices. The sub-index SPGI Target Setting takes values between
0 and 10 with better-governed pension funds having higher values. The sub-index measures the
governance quality with regard to target setting and management objectives based on ten
objective and measurable criteria.




Transparency on the minimum required return 1
Estimate of the minimum required return considers all pivotal
inﬂuencing factors
1





Binding objectives for the board of trustees 1
Functional speciﬁcations for the CEO 1




Financial compensation for the board of trustees members 1
Compensation of board of trustees members linked to
management objectives
1
Regular performance evaluation of the CEO 1
Code of conduct implemented 1
Total 10
10 Accumulation of value ﬂuctuation reserves is only relevant in case the minimum required reserves are not
yet fully funded.
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structures are required to comply with good governance. The SPGI rewards pension
funds with ﬁnancial compensation for the members of the board of trustees (7). On
the one hand, ﬁnancial compensation for board members will help to attract highly
qualiﬁed and experienced individuals. On the other hand, board members might feel
a stronger obligation to spend time and resources on pension fund matters when
they are ﬁnancially compensated. In the UK, Clark and Urwin (2007) ﬁnd best
practice examples of pension funds that not only ﬁnancially compensate their board
members but also link the compensation to the mission and performance of the fund.
This seems to be a promising approach also for Swiss pension funds. Therefore, the
SPGI encourages a process that links the ﬁnancial compensation of board members
to the objectives of the board (8). This requirement is supported by Impavido (2002)
and Hess and Impavido (2003). It is of high importance that incentive structures are
also aligned with the objectives for the CEO. Clapman (2007) proposes that pension
funds should establish and maintain regular processes by which staﬀ performance
is measured. Therefore, the SPGI rewards such pension funds that conduct per-
formance evaluations of the CEO on a regular basis (9). Pension funds can, thereby,
often fall back on existing performance evaluation processes of the sponsoring com-
pany. Finally, incentive structures must ensure the proper use of pension assets
and prevent misuse. To obtain the maximum of 10 index points, pension funds
must therefore have implemented the rules and regulations of the Swiss Code of
Conduct11 of the Swiss Pension Fund Association (ASIP) and the Swiss Insurance
Association (SVV).
4.3 Investment strategy
The third SPGI sub-index allows for the assessment of the governance quality with
regard to the investment strategy. The sub-index SPGI Investment Strategy takes
values between 0 and 9. Details of the composition of the sub-index are provided in
Table 3.
To comply with good governance, pension funds must align their investment
strategy with their target of ﬁnancing and their risk-taking capacity. On the one hand,
this implies an investment strategy that is appropriate to earn at least the minimum
required return in the long run. On the other hand, the current risk-taking capacity,
measured by the funding ratio, determines the risk budget, which in turn restricts the
ﬂexibility of choosing an investment strategy. The determination of the investment
strategy is of such great importance that this decision should be based on a pro-
fessional asset–liability study (index point 1), as proposed by Brandenberger and Hilb
(2008).
Furthermore, the SPGI insists on a realistic return expectation of the investment
strategy (2). We use historic returns12 to assess the expected return of the investment
strategy speciﬁed by the pension funds in the survey. The expected return is judged as
realistic when it is smaller than or equal to the historic return of the investment
11 The Code of Conduct was issued in the year 2000 and is designed to support the proper use of pension
funds and prevent misuse.
12 See Appendix Tables A1 and A2 for details of the benchmark indices used to assess the expected return.
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strategy. It should be taken into consideration that a tolerance margin of 5% is
applied. Finally, the expected return must be greater than or equal to the minimum
required return (3) to obtain another SPGI index point.13 This important requirement
ensures that the pension fund maintains its ﬁnancial balance in the long run. In
case the minimum required return is not speciﬁed in the survey or does not consider
all pivotal inﬂuencing factors, we estimate the eﬀective minimum required return.14
Since both the return prospects of the investment strategy and the minimum required
return can change over time, both parameters need to be reviewed on a regular
basis (4).
Good governed pension funds follow investment strategies that are not only
aligned with the minimum required return but also with the current risk-taking
capacity. Since the funding ratio must not stay below 100% over a longer period of
time, pension funds accumulate reserves to smoothen out ﬂuctuations on investment
Table 3. Composition of the sub-index SPGI Investment Strategy
The SPGI consists of six sub-indices. The sub-index SPGI Investment Strategy takes values
between 0 and 9 with better-governed pension funds having higher values. The sub-index
measures the governance quality with regard to investment strategy based on nine objective
and measurable criteria.
Best practice Assessment criteria SPGI
Investment strategy Aligned
with target of ﬁnancing
and risk-taking capacity
Investment strategy based on asset-liability study 1
Realistic estimate of the expected return of the
investment strategy
1
Expected return of investment strategy greater than or
equal to the minimum required return
1
Regular review of the expected return against the
minimum required return
1
Realistic estimate of the minimum required value
ﬂuctuation reserves
1
Existing value ﬂuctuation reserves greater than or
equal to the minimum required value ﬂuctuation
reserves
1
Utilization of the existing value ﬂuctuation reserves 1
Tactical ﬂuctuation margins around the strategic asset
allocation
1
Full utilization of degrees of
freedom in the legal
requirements
Application of Article 59 of the OOB2 1
Total 9
13 If the expected return is assessed as not realistic, we compare the historic return of the investment
strategy with the minimum required return.
14 The estimate of the minimum required return is based on a statutory minimum interest rate of 2.5%, the
technical interest rate as provided by the pension funds, provisions for longevity of 0.5%, and admin-
istration costs of 0.3%. If the required value ﬂuctuation reserves are not yet fully funded, another 0.5%
is added.
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returns. To comply with good governance, pension funds should have a realistic
estimate of the minimum required value ﬂuctuation reserves (5). Since the LPP does
not stipulate a calculation methodology, we use value-at-risk15 to assess the minimum
required value ﬂuctuation reserves that pension funds specify in the survey. The
minimum required value ﬂuctuation reserves are assessed as realistic when they are
greater than or equal to our value-at-risk-based estimate. Again, we apply a tolerance
margin of 5%. For an investment strategy to be aligned with the risk-taking capacity
of the pension fund, existing value ﬂuctuation reserves have to be greater than or
equal to the minimum required reserves (6). On the other hand, excess reserves should
be either utilized or passed down to the plan members. Therefore, the SPGI rewards
pension funds that have excess reserves smaller than or equal to 5% in terms of
liabilities (7). In reality, the eﬀective asset allocation often deviates from the strategic
asset allocation since asset classes show diﬀerent investment returns. To avoid the
eﬀective asset allocation containing a risk proﬁle in excess of the risk-taking capacity
of the fund, we postulate that good governed pension funds deﬁne tactical ﬂuctuation
margins around the strategic asset allocation (8). Finally, the SPGI rewards pension
funds that fully utilize the degrees of freedom in the legal requirement by making use
of the possibilities of expanding the investment universe according to Article 59 of the
OOB2 (9). However, this implies that the risk-taking capacity of the pension fund is
suﬃcient.
4.4 Investment rules and organization
The fourth SPGI sub-index measures the governance quality with regard to invest-
ment rules and organization and takes values between 0 and 7. Table 4 provides the
detailed composition of the sub-index SPGI Investment Rules and Organization.
The implementation of the investment strategy requires in a ﬁrst step a clear
regulation of the investment process. For this purpose, pension funds normally deﬁne
investment regulations (index point 1). Brandenberger and Hilb (2008) provide an
overview of the key elements of best practice investment regulations. Best practice
investment regulations should cover objectives and general principles, investment
organization16, investment guidelines17 and controlling and reporting (2 and 3)18. In
addition, investment regulations should govern accounting, loyalty in asset manage-
ment and the exercise of voting rights (4)19.
15 We determine the reserves with which the funding ratio will not fall below 100% within 1 year with a
99% probability. Further input parameters are the expected return and the volatility of the investment
strategy. If the expected return is not assessed as realistic, we apply historic returns. The volatility of the
investment strategy is based on the historic returns of the benchmark indices described in Appendix
Tables A1 and A2.
16 The investment organization governs the duties and competencies associated with the investment pro-
cess.
17 The investment guidelines govern the investment strategy, the investment style, the investment form and
the approved investment instruments.
18 Investment regulations, objectives and general principles, investment organization, and investment
guidelines are each rewarded with 1/2 index points.
19 Accounting, loyalty regulations in asset management and exercising voting rights are each rewarded with
1/3 index points.
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Furthermore, the implementation of the investment strategy requires a detailed
investment reasoning, as proposed by Clark and Urwin (2007) and Monk (2007).
Therefore, the SPGI insists on a detailed analysis of the asset structuring (5). This
analysis implies important decisions such as active versus passive investment style or
direct mandates versus collective investment vehicles.
The last step in the implementation of the investment strategy is the selection of
asset managers. Manager selection is of great importance but sensitive at the same
time since conﬂicts of interests might exist. Therefore, a transparent selection of ex-
ternal asset managers is imperative. This implies a clear and traceable process for
evaluating and selecting external managers (6). In addition, we postulate that pension
funds should have a predeﬁned catalogue of criteria for the evaluation of external
managers (7).
4.5 Controlling and steering
The ﬁfth SPGI sub-index indicates the governance quality of pension funds with
regard to controlling and steering. As shown in Tables 5 and 6, the sub-index con-
tributes a maximum of 26 index points to the SPGI. Thus, it is the largest of the six
sub-indices.
It is highly imperative to the safety of the retirement income that the board of
trustees approaches and solves problems in a timely manner. This requires that target
deviations are identiﬁed and understood as early and as fast as possible. Therefore,
Brandenberger and Hilb (2008) state that a comprehensive management information
system is essential for a pension fund. An information concept20 builds always the
basis of a management information system (index point 1). Brandenberger and Hilb
Table 4. Composition of the sub-index SPGI Investment Rules and Organization
The SPGI consists of six sub-indices. The sub-index SPGI Investment Rules and Organization
takes values between 0 and 7 with better-governed pension funds having higher values. The
sub-index measures the governance quality with regard to investment rules and organization
based on ﬁve objective and measurable criteria.
Best practice Assessment criteria SPGI
Clear regulation of the
investment process
Investment regulations 1





Detailed analysis of asset structuring 1
Transparent selection of
external asset managers
Clear process for evaluating and selecting external
managers
1




20 An information concept governs the acquisition of information, the information content, the infor-
mation frequency and the recipients.
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Table 5. Composition of the sub-index SPGI Controlling and Steering (part I)
The SPGI consists of six sub-indices. The sub-index SPGI Controlling and Steering takes
values between 0 and 26 with better-governed pension funds having higher values. The
sub-index measures the governance quality with regard to controlling and steering based
on 19 objective and measurable criteria.





Key management information available on a monthly
basis
8
Management information available in a consolidated
report
1
Annual projections of the funding situation 1
Stress tests included in the projections of funding
situation
1
Designated investment controller 1
Regular information on the developments of the
ﬁnancial markets for the board and investment
committee members
1
Regular compliance checks Annual assessment of compliance with laws 1
Annual assessment of compliance with restrictions of
asset management mandates
1
Table 6. Composition of the sub-index SPGI Controlling and Steering (part II)
The SPGI consists of six sub-indices. The sub-index SPGI Controlling and Steering takes
values between 0 and 26 with better-governed pension funds having higher values. The
sub-index measures the governance quality with regard to controlling and steering based
on 19 objective and measurable criteria.
Best practice Assessment criteria SPGI
In-depth root cause analysis Performance analysis 1
Performance attribution 1
Risk attribution 1
Regular cost control 1
Regular cost benchmarking against peer group 1
Action-oriented and real-time
management decisions
At least six meetings of the board of trustees per
annum
1
At least 12 meetings of the investment committee per
annum
1
Management reporting includes recommendations
for corrective measures
1
Intervention guidelines in case of violations of the
tactical ﬂuctuation margins
1
Intervention guidelines in case of a signiﬁcant
deterioration of the funding ratio
1
Total 26
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(2008) provide an excellent overview of information and data that should be provided
by a management information system. The SPGI proposes that the following
management information be made available on a monthly basis (2–9)21 : estimate of
the current funding ratio, eﬀective asset allocation, performance of total assets, policy
return22, performance per asset class, performance of respective benchmark indices
per asset class, performance per mandate and performance of the respective bench-
mark indices per mandate. For the sake of clarity, this information should be avail-
able in a consolidated report (10).
All these information allow for a comprehensive assessment of the current ﬁnancial
situation. To obtain a forward-looking perspective, we propose annual projections
of the funding situation (11). A simple way of doing such a projection is to calculate
forward-looking conﬁdence intervals for the funding ratio of the next 12 or
24 months applying diﬀerent safety levels such as 90, 95 or 99%. Brandenberger and
Hilb (2008) propose a convincing approach to graphically illustrate the results of such
a projection. Furthermore, the authors propose to run historical projections for
diﬃcult years such as the year 2002 with a big stock market slump. Our index
incorporates this proposal and rewards pension funds that run forward-looking stress
tests (12).
Impavido (2002) postulates that performance evaluations should be conducted
by independent entities on a regular basis. The SPGI considers the request for
independent controlling resources and rewards pension funds that have a dedicated
(internal or external) investment controller (13). The latter should not be in charge of
any management or oversight responsibilities beyond the investment controlling to
avoid potential conﬂicts of interests. In addition to the abovementioned information,
board members as well as members of the investment committee should be informed
on the developments of the ﬁnancial markets on a regular basis (14). Since decen-
tralized information collection is not an eﬃcient way, information on the develop-
ment of the ﬁnancial markets should be compiled and synthesized by a central entity
such as the investment controller.
One further element of best practice controlling processes is regular compliance
checks. OECD guidelines provide for the regular assessment of compliance with laws.
However, to comply with good governance, the SPGI insists not only on regular
assessments of compliance with laws (15) but also on compliance checks with regard
to restrictions of asset management mandates (16) such as maximum tracking errors
or approved investment instruments.
While problem identiﬁcation makes up just one side of the coin, problem-solving
requires an in-depth root-cause-analysis to understand existing target deviations. We
therefore propose to conduct a basic set of deviation analyses on a regular basis.
Pension funds are recommended to conduct performance analysis (17) across all asset
classes and mandates to obtain a risk-adjusted view on the performance of their
assets. A performance attribution (18) helps pension funds to identify sources of
21 Monthly availability of information is rewarded with 1 index point, quarterly availability with 0.5 index
points and semi-annual availability with 0.25 index points.
22 The policy return is the return that would have been earned had the strategic asset allocation been
consistently followed and implemented passively before deduction of any costs.
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performance deviations such as timing and selection ability of the portfolio manager.
To get a better understanding of their investment risks, pension funds should ﬁnally
accomplish risk attribution (19) that includes a decomposition of risk into sources of
systematic and speciﬁc risks or into various factors such as industry or currency.
Costs are important because they reduce the rate of return on investments (Bikker
and de Dreu, 2006). Therefore, pension funds should have transparency on the
development of their administration and asset management costs. The SPGI postu-
lates costs controls on a regular basis (20). To facilitate a better assessment of the cost
eﬃciency, administration and asset management costs should additionally be
benchmarked against other comparable pension funds (21).
Well-governed pension funds are not immune to target deviations but they identify
and approach problems in a timely manner. However, only action-oriented real-time
decisions bring the pension fund back on track. This requires that governing bodies
of a pension fund, in particular the board of trustees and the investment committee,
meet regularly. In the light of the great responsibility, a meeting interval of once in
every 2 months by the board of trustees is deemed appropriate (22). Given the fast
changing dynamics of the capital markets, the investment committee should meet
more often. We therefore suggest a meeting frequency of once each month for the
investment committee (23). However, having a full-time CEO allows a lesser meeting
frequency.23 To ensure eﬀective and eﬃcient decision-making in the board and in-
vestment committee meetings, management reporting should contain fact-based re-
commendations for corrective measures (24), as proposed by Brandenberger and Hilb
(2008). These recommendations may be developed by the CEO or by the investment
controller.
Certain situations, such as a signiﬁcant deterioration of the funding ratio in com-
bination with high stock market volatilities, require fast decision-making. At the
same time, decision-making in such exceptional circumstances requires intensive
preparation and leads often to controversial discussions in the board. We therefore
agree with Brandenberger and Hilb (2008) and recommend the deﬁnition of inter-
vention guidelines for the case of violations of the tactical ﬂuctuation margins (25)
and a signiﬁcant deterioration of the pension fund’s risk-taking capacity (26).
4.6 Communication
The SPGI Communication is the sixth sub-index. As the name indicates, the sub-
index measures the governance quality of pension funds with regard to communi-
cation. The sub-index takes values between 0 and 3, as shown in Table 7.
The OECD guidelines propose disclosure of information to active plan participants
and beneﬁciaries. This is supported by Impavido (2002). The author postulates that
all plan members should receive information on the objectives of the fund, its agenda
to achieve the stated objectives, and the rights of the plan members. We support
broad disclosure of information. However, there are additional dialog partners be-
sides pension fund members. Therefore, the SPGI rewards pension funds with a
23 If the pension fund employs a full-time CEO, the board of trustees should meet at least once per quarter
and the investment committee every 2 months.
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communication concept (1) governing the information content and channels for the
diﬀerent dialog groups such as employers, unions, or media. Even though there are
many dialog partners, pension fund members remain the key addressees. Therefore,
pension fund members should receive information on important activities and results
on a regular basis (2). We believe that a quarter-yearly interval for the circulation of
information is adequate (3).
In summary, it can be stated that the SPGI is based on tangible and therefore
objectively measurable governance components. This is of great importance for the
scoring of individual pension funds since we intend to create an objective governance
metric that does not rely on the perception of pension fund representatives. We are
well aware that our index does, therefore, not cover all aspects of best practice pen-
sion fund governance. In particular, the index does not consider soft factors that
cannot be objectively measured such as board member competence or skills of pen-
sion fund staﬀ. Furthermore, the index cannot make full allowance for the great
diversity of pension funds in Switzerland. Nevertheless, we believe that pension funds
have commonalities and that the SPGI is therefore a reasonable indicator for the
governance quality of Swiss pension funds.
5 Governance quality of Swiss pension funds
In this section, we use the SPGI to assess the governance quality of Swiss pension
funds. For this purpose, we conduct a survey among 500 Swiss pension funds. We
received completed questionnaires from 96 pension funds. This is an acceptable re-
sponse rate of about 19%. The summary statistics of our data sample are provided in
Table 8.
Our sample can be considered representative with respect to pension funds assets.
With assets of about CHF 194 billion as of the year-end 2006, pension funds in our
sample account for about one-third of pension fund assets in Switzerland.24 On the
contrary, our sample is not deemed representative as far as the number of pension
funds is concerned. Our sample covers just between 4 and 5% of registered pension
Table 7. Composition of the sub-index SPGI Communication
The SPGI consists of six sub-indices. The sub-index SPGI Communication takes values
between 0 and 3 with better-governed pension funds having higher values. The sub-index
measures the governance quality with regard to communication based on three objective and
measurable criteria.




Regular information of plan members on
important activities and results
1
Quarterly information frequency 1
Total 3
24 According to the 2006 pension funds statistics of the Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce.
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funds in Switzerland. As a result, the sample is heavily biased towards larger
pension funds. As shown in Table 8, the average pension fund size in our sample is
more than CHF 2 billion compared with an average of CHF 267 million across
all registered pension funds in Switzerland. However, the median size of CHF 495
million indicates that the average size in our sample is strongly inﬂuenced by a few
very large pension funds. Indeed, it must be kept in mind that our sample also
includes very small pension funds such as the smallest fund in the sample with assets
of only CHF 2.6 million. Finally, deﬁned beneﬁt plans and public pension funds are
overrepresented in our sample.
The bias of our sample towards larger pension funds, deﬁned beneﬁt plans and
public pension funds may aﬀect the overall assessment of the governance quality of
Swiss pension funds. On the contrary, these selection biases have no impact on the
analysis of the statistical relationship between the quality of governance and per-
formance since we control for size, plan type and legal form. With regard to the
overall assessment of the governance quality, we expect the size to be a real constraint
on the quality of governance since the implementation and maintenance of several
SPGI constituents is associated with signiﬁcant resources and costs. It therefore goes
that the overall governance quality of Swiss pension funds may be overestimated in
the face of the selection bias towards larger pension funds. To have a better under-
standing of the eﬀect of this selection bias therefore, we carry out further investi-
gation of the relationship between size and governance quality in the next section.
The eﬀect of the selection bias with respect to plan type and legal form remains
unclear and is also subject to further investigation in the next section.
5.1 Scoring system
In this section, we describe how completed questionnaires are translated into SPGI
score values by index component and pension fund. To make score values compar-
able and as objective as possible, pension funds were not asked to provide any
self-assessments of their governance quality. We share the concerns, raised by
Table 8. Summary statistics of the pension fund data sample
Number, assets, plan type and legal form of the 96 pension funds in our data sample in
comparison with the pension fund universe in Switzerland. Summary statistics are as of the
year-end 2006.
Data sample Universe
Pension funds 96 2140
Assets (CHF million) 193,696 570,340
Assets per pension fund (CHF million) 2018 267
Deﬁned contribution plans (67%) (89%)
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans (33%) (11%)
Private pension funds (81%) (95%)
Public pension funds (19%) (5%)
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Ambachtsheer, Capelle, and Lum (2007), that self-reported scores may be a biased
indicator of the eﬀective governance quality. For this reason, we constructed the
SPGI such that self-assessments of pension funds are not required for the attribution
of individual score values. On the contrary, pension funds were asked in the ques-
tionnaire to provide pure facts. Based on these facts, we attributed score values by
index component and pension fund.
The questionnaire covers all SPGI assessment criteria described in Section 4. The
vast majority of these assessment criteria, such as a full-time CEO or ﬁnancial com-
pensation for the board of trustees, can be covered by yes/no questions. In such a
case, the answers are directly converted into index points. However, some assessment
criteria, such as optimal board size or consideration of all pivotal elements for the
minimum required return estimate, cannot be covered by yes/no questions. In such
cases, we ask for additional information, such as the number of board members, or
provide a selection of potential answers such as interest liabilities and longevity as
pivotal elements for the minimum required return estimate. The answers to these
questions are then indirectly converted into index points as described in Section 4.
In summary, it can be stated that our score values are not based on perceived
governance quality of pension funds. On the contrary, the score values are directly
or indirectly derived from answers to yes/no questions or from pure facts provided by
pension funds in the questionnaire. As a result, the score values should be an unbiased
indicator of the eﬀective governance quality of pension funds. On the other hand, we
omit all soft factors of good governance that cannot be objectively measured.
5.2 Survey results
As shown in Table 9, pension funds achieve, on average, 42.8 index points or 66% of
the SPGI maximum (65 index points). Index values in the sample range from low 17.5
Table 9. SPGI index values of the survey participants
Descriptive statistics of the survey-based SPGI and its six sub-indices. The sample consists of
96 Swiss pension funds. Maximum index points of the SPGI and per sub-index are reported in
parentheses. The current governance quality of Swiss pension funds is indicated by the mean







SPGI Total (65) 42.8 45.0 9.1 17.5 59.5 66%
SPGI – Organization (10) 5.9 6.0 1.7 1.0 9.0 59%
SPGI – Target Setting (10) 5.6 6.0 1.9 1.0 9.0 56%
SPGI – Investment Rules and
Strategy (9)
7.4 7.0 1.1 4.0 9.0 82%
SPGI – Investment Organization (7) 5.4 5.0 1.2 3.2 7.0 76%
SPGI – Controlling and Steering (26) 16.6 16.9 5.5 3.5 26.0 64%
SPGI – Communication (3) 2.1 2.0 0.7 1.0 3.0 69%
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to high 59.5 index points. We ﬁnd some evidence for potential governance issues in
the areas of organization and target setting. Some of the potential governance issues
are highlighted below.
As in other countries, board composition seems to be one of the key issues in
Switzerland according to our survey. More than 70% of the pension funds in the
sample have boards beyond the optimal size. The average board size in the sample is
between 9 and 10 with the ultimate impact of rendering eﬀective decision-making
diﬃcult. Moreover, board of trustees often include several ex oﬃcio members that are
not primarily appointed because of their expertise. An additional weak point is direct
access to external know-how. More than 75% of the pension funds in the sample do
not have external experts in the board of trustees. At least half of the pension funds
have external experts in the investment committee. At the positive end, the majority
of pension funds has a CEO and a separate investment committee with an average
size between four and ﬁve members.
Target setting is the second area for which our index indicates major governance
issues. A signiﬁcant part of the pension funds in the sample seems to have limited
transparency on the minimum required return. Although all but one pension fund
specify a minimum required return in the questionnaire, a high share of 40% does
not consider all pivotal inﬂuencing factors and may therefore underestimate the
minimum required return. Management objectives for the board of trustees seem to
be the exception rather than the rule. Only 18% of the pension funds deﬁne objectives
for the board of trustees. Furthermore, the majority of pension funds does not
compensate their board members ﬁnancially. In the face of the huge responsibility
inherent in board membership, this is a somewhat surprising result. Contrary to the
governance literature and positive experiences in other countries (Clark and Urwin,
2007), none of the pension funds links the ﬁnancial compensation of the board
members to target achievement.
As shown in Table 9, the governance quality with regard to the investment strategy
measured by the SPGI seems to be at the high end. The vast majority of pension funds
has realistic return expectations of the investment strategy. However, in more than
20% of the cases, the investment strategy is expected to yield, on average, returns
below the minimum required return. In such a case, the ﬁnancial stability of the
pension funds is not guaranteed in the long run. This is an alarming result given that
only half of the pension funds in our sample have value ﬂuctuation reserves at the
desired level.
The sub-index SPGI Investment Rules and Organization indicates high governance
standards of Swiss pension funds with respect to the investment organization.
Nevertheless, we ﬁnd governance issues for the selection of external asset managers.
Only about 40% of the pension funds in the sample have a predeﬁned process for
selecting and evaluating external managers. Even though the selection of external
managers is of great importance, the majority of pension funds seems not to have a
catalogue of criteria for the evaluation of external managers.
The meeting frequency seems to be another key issue for Swiss pension funds
according to our survey. Only one out of every three investment committees meets on
a monthly basis or once in every 2 months, where there is a full-time CEO. Regarding
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the meeting frequency of the board of trustees, almost 50% of the pension funds in
the sample do not comply with the SPGI governance standards. Given the fast
dynamics of the capital markets, a higher meeting frequency seems to be rec-
ommendable. In contrast, the management information systems of Swiss pension
funds meet rather high standards. On average, the most important management
information is available at least on a quarterly basis. However, there are pension
funds in the sample that have no management information available on a regular
basis. Without regular and reliable information on the ﬁnancial situation of the
pension fund, the board of trustees can actually not comply with their requirements
and the safety of the retirement income is not guaranteed. We ﬁnd that almost 50%
of the pension funds in the sample do not employ a designated investment controller.
For these pension funds, the independence of investment controlling, which is an
important element of good governance, is not guaranteed. The lack of designated
controlling resources might also explain why numerous pension funds do not conduct
deviation analyses on a regular basis. It remains unclear whether these pension funds
are able to deﬁne eﬀective measures in the case of target deviations.
On the whole, there are no indications of serious governance issues with Swiss
pension funds. However, it must be kept in mind that our sample is biased towards
larger pension funds and size seems to be a real constraint on governance. Therefore,
we are up against the risk of overestimating the eﬀective governance quality of Swiss
pension funds. In addition, since the survey is on a voluntary basis, willingness to
participate on the part of pension funds could imply that they belong to the ‘high
quality end’ of a much larger universe of pension funds.
6 Relation between governance quality and investment performance
In this section, we investigate the statistical relationship between pension fund
governance, measured by the SPGI, and investment performance. For this purpose,
data collected for the survey go beyond those required by the governance index.
Information such as performance, size, plan type and costs is also gathered. The
investigation is based on data of the years 2005 and 2006.
6.1 Model
In a ﬁrst step we need to identify an appropriate performance measure. The literature
suggests alpha as performance measure. However, pension funds have limited pos-
sibilities of directly inﬂuencing the alpha, in particular, when asset management
is outsourced. The alpha is rather determined by the skills of the asset manager than
by the governance quality of the pension fund. In addition, our sample contains only
yearly performance data, making it diﬃcult to estimate alphas. Therefore, we use a
performance metric for measuring the value creation of pension funds. According
to Ambachtsheer (1996) and Ambacht sheer, Capelle, and Scheibelhut (1998), value
creation of pension funds comes from two fundamental sources : ﬁrst, a strategic
asset allocation generating returns above the minimum required returns on the liab-
ility side. The second source of value creation is an implementation strategy that
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creates additional returns by active asset management. Both the decision on the
strategic asset allocation and the decision on the implementation style have impli-
cations on costs which have to be considered. Following Ambachtsheer (1996), we




+(Gross fund returnxGross policy return)
xOperating costs:
(1)
Decision on the strategic asset allocation as an initial source of value creation is
mirrored by the diﬀerence between the gross policy return and the minimum required
return in equation (1). Gross policy return is the estimated return that would have
been earned if the strategic asset allocation had been implemented passively before
the deduction of any costs. In our questionnaire we asked pension funds for their
strategic asset allocation. To determine gross policy return we use standard bench-
mark indices25 and multiply the index returns with the strategic weights of the re-
spective asset classes. As mentioned, minimum required returns were asked for in the
survey. In case this return was not provided, or assessed as not realistic, we estimate
the minimum required return.26 The second decision that is of importance to the value
creation of pension funds is represented by the diﬀerence between the gross fund
return and the gross policy return. This diﬀerence is simply the outperformance or
underperformance of the fund against its policy benchmark before costs. The sum of
the asset allocation and the implementation component are now reduced by the op-
erating costs27 in percent of total assets, as shown in equation (1). This is due to the
fact that both the decision on the strategic asset allocation and the implementation
style aﬀect asset management and, partly, administration costs.
The determinants of a pension fund’s performance are manifold. To investigate the
relationship between pension fund governance and performance, we adopt the fol-
lowing model :
NVA=c0+c1  SPGI+c2  ADCO+c3  AMCO+c4  SIZE
+c5  CORA+c6  LEFO+c7  PLTY,
(2)
where SPGI is our governance index. Given the empirical evidence on mutual fund
performance, we expect costs to have an important inﬂuence on pension fund per-
formance. Therefore, we include administration and asset management costs in our
model. ADCO represents administration costs and is deﬁned as total costs of ad-
ministration divided by total assets. Asset management costs, represented by the
variable AMCO, are also expressed as a percentage of total assets. Ambachtsheer,
25 See Appendix Table A1 for details of the benchmark indices used to calculate the gross policy return.
26 The estimate of the minimum required return is based on a statutory minimum interest rate of 2.5%, the
technical interest rate as provided by the pension funds, provisions for longevity of 0.5%, and admin-
istration costs of 0.3%. If the required value ﬂuctuation reserves are not yet fully funded, another 0.5%
is added.
27 Operating costs are the sum of administration and asset management costs.
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Capelle, and Scheibelhut (1998) report a signiﬁcant relation between performance
and pension fund size. Therefore, we include the variable SIZE, which is the natural
logarithm of total pension funds assets, in our performance equation. Furthermore,
we expect the coverage ratio, CORA, to have an inﬂuence on performance since it
determines the pension fund’s degrees of freedom with regard to the investment
strategy. The legal form and the plan type might also have an inﬂuence on the per-
formance. The legal form is represented by the dummy variable LEFO, which takes
a value of 1 if the pension fund is under public law. Finally, PLTY represents
the plan type. The dummy variable takes the value 1 in the case of a deﬁned contri-
bution plan.
Correlations of the regression factors are reported in Table 10. In order to cope
with the problem of multicollinearity, factors with correlations above 0.5 are ortho-
gonalized before being used as regressors. Correlations provided in Table 10 allow for
a ﬁrst evaluation to determine if the selection biases of the sample aﬀect the assess-
ment of the governance quality. As expected, size and governance quality are highly
correlated. As a result, we are likely to overestimate the overall governance quality of
Swiss pension funds. The eﬀective governance quality of the total pension fund uni-
verse in Switzerland is expected to be lower. In contrast however, the legal form and
the plan type are only marginally correlated with the SPGI. Therefore, the over-
representation of deﬁned beneﬁt plans and public pension funds is not expected
to have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on our assessment of the governance quality of
Swiss pension funds. As already mentioned, the selection biases in our sample have
no eﬀect on the investigation of the statistical relationship between governance
quality and performance since we control for size, plan type and legal form, as shown
in equation (2).
6.2 Empirical results
The investigation of the relationship between pension fund governance and per-
formance proceeds in three steps. First, we investigate the overall statistical
Table 10. Correlations of regression factors
Correlations of the factors explaining pension fund performance. SPGI is a standard metric for
the governance quality of Swiss pension funds. ADCO represents the administration costs and
AMCO the asset management costs. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total pension assets,
CORA the coverage ratio, LEFO the legal form and PLTY the plan type. The variables are
based on a sample of 96 Swiss pension funds.
SPGI ADCO AMCO SIZE CORA LEFO
ADCO x0.49 1.00
AMCO x0.14 0.18 1.00
SIZE 0.62 x0.68 x0.49 1.00
CORA x0.17 0.01 0.07 x0.20 1.00
LEFO x0.01 0.01 x0.17 0.23 x0.35 1.00
PLTY x0.07 0.23 0.08 x0.33 0.06 x0.23
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relationship between pension fund governance and performance. Governance quality
is thereby measured by the SPGI and its six sub-indices, and performance is measured
by the NVA. In a second step, we investigate the eﬀect of good governance on the two
individual sources of value creation separately. Finally, we analyze the inﬂuence of
individual governance mechanisms, such as a CEO or a designated investment con-
troller, on the performance of pension funds. Our investigation is based on the model
described by equation (2).
The results in Table 11 show that pension fund governance is positively related to
performance. The governance coeﬃcient in equation (1) of Table 11 is signiﬁcant at
the 10% level. On average, the impact of governance on performance is as much as
9 basis points per index point. In contrast, not all of the six SPGI sub-indices are
signiﬁcantly related to performance, as shown in equations (2)–(7) of Table 11. Only
for the two sub-indices SPGI Target Setting and SPGI Investment Strategy, do we
ﬁnd the expected positive relation between pension fund governance and perform-
ance. Both sub-indices include important governance elements such as transparency
on the target of ﬁnancing, measurable management objectives, and an investment
strategy that is aligned with the target of ﬁnancing and the risk-taking capacity. The
remaining four sub-indices exhibit the expected positive sign. However, the coeﬃ-
cients are statistically not signiﬁcant. Of the non-governance-related variables, only
the coverage ratio and to a certain extent administration costs have explanatory
power.
Somewhat surprising though, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant inﬂuence of good organiz-
ational governance on performance. A potential explanation for this ﬁnding is that
some governance mechanisms are potentially not relevant for both sources of value
creation. On the other hand, the eﬀects on the two components of our performance
measure may be mutually eliminative. Therefore, we investigate the eﬀect of pension
fund governance on the two sources of value creation separately. Table 12 shows the
impact of pension fund governance on the ﬁrst source of value creation, which is the
decision on the strategic asset allocation. The results show a positive relationship
between overall pension fund governance and performance, as shown in equation (1)
of Table 12. Again, we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence only for two of the
SPGI sub-indices. The SPGI Target Setting and the SPGI Investment Rules and
Organization are positively related to value creation from the decision on the stra-
tegic asset allocation.
Table 13 provides the results of the investigation for the second source of value
creation. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the overall governance quality on the out-
performance or underperformance of the fund against its policy benchmark. It seems
that target setting and investment organization also have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
value creation from active implementation style. However, good organizational
governance is not, as expected, positively related to performance. Pension funds with
high values of the sub-index SPGI Investment Rules and Organization tend to have a
lower outperformance.28
28 For the period of investigation, pension funds in the sample show an average outperformance of 0.81%
against their policy benchmark.
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Table 11. Results from OLS regressions of NVA on diﬀerent SPGI governance indices
Results of OLS regressions of the 2005 and 2006 NVA on the SPGI and its six sub-indices as well as costs, size, coverage ratio, plan type, and legal form.
The sample consists of 96 Swiss pension funds. Statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are marked with asterisks.
Independent variable
Dependent variable=NVA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant x0.0082 x0.0229 0.0409 x0.0686 x0.0261 x0.0233 x0.0274
SPGI Total 0.0009*
SPGI – Organization 0.0022
SPGI – Target Setting 0.0077***
SPGI – Investment Strategy 0.0062**
SPGI – Investment Rules
and Organization
0.0039
SPGI – Controlling and
Steering
0.0001
SPGI – Communication 0.0067
ADCO x4.4862 x3.8069 x6.5335* x1.9503 x3.6961 x3.8399 x4.4880
AMCO 1.8198 2.4792 1.8728 3.1183 2.3910 2.5575 2.4756
SIZE 0.0005 0.0009 x0.0039 0.0014 0.0004 0.0013 0.0007
CORA 0.0615** 0.0542** 0.0567** 0.0556** 0.0593** 0.0573** 0.0612***
LEFO 0.0057 0.0016 0.0064 0.0083 0.0044 0.0032 0.0034
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Table 12. Results from OLS regressions of value creation from the choice of the strategic asset allocation on diﬀerent
SPGI governance indices
Results of OLS regressions of the 2005 and 2006 value creation from the choice of the strategic asset allocation on the SPGI and its six sub-indices as well
as costs, size, coverage ratio, plan type and legal form. The value creation is mirrored by the diﬀerence between the gross policy return and the minimum
required return. The sample consists of 96 Swiss pension funds. Statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are marked with asterisks.
Independent variable
Dependent variable=Gross policy returnxMinimum required return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant 0.0009 x0.0053 0.0123 x0.0164 x0.0073 x0.0040 x0.0080
SPGI Total 0.0004*
SPGI – Organization 0.0012
SPGI – Target Setting 0.0022***
SPGI – Investment Strategy 0.0014
SPGI – Investment Rules
and Organization
0.0030**
SPGI – Controlling and
Steering
0.0001
SPGI – Communication 0.0043
ADCO x1.8877 x1.5800 x2.3775** x1.1815 x1.4783 x1.5484 x2.0101
AMCO 1.2867 1.5593 1.4260 1.7529 1.4621 1.5370 1.5443
SIZE x0.0006 x0.0005 x0.0017 x0.0002 x0.0010 x0.0004 x0.0007
CORA 0.0153 0.0118 0.0132 0.0129 0.0151* 0.0140 0.0161
LEFO 0.0018 x0.0002 0.0016 0.0019 0.0017 0.0009 0.0009
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Table 13. Results from OLS regressions of value creation from active implementation on diﬀerent SPGI governance indices
Results of OLS regressions of the 2005 and 2006 value creation from active implementation on the SPGI and its six sub-indices as well as costs, size,
coverage ratio, plan type and legal form. The value creation is mirrored by the diﬀerence between the gross fund return and the gross policy return. The
sample consists of 96 Swiss pension funds. Statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are marked with asterisks.
Independent variable
Dependent variable=Gross fund returnxGross policy return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant 0.0012 0.0017 0.0208 x0.0055 0.0025 x0.0034 0.0021
SPGI Total x0.0001
SPGI – Organization x0.0001
SPGI – Target Setting 0.0022***
SPGI – Investment Strategy 0.0010
SPGI – Investment Rules
and Organization
x0.0024*
SPGI – Controlling and
Steering
x0.0003
SPGI – Communication x0.0010
ADCO x0.1141 x0.1351 x0.9019 0.1857 x0.2523 x0.3009 x0.0443
AMCO 0.1972 0.1746 x0.0471 0.2526 0.3142 0.3821 0.1934
SIZE x0.0001 x0.0001 x0.0017 x0.0001 0.0006 0.0004 x0.0001
CORA 0.0090 0.0093 0.0092 0.0090 0.0077 0.0076 0.0085
LEFO 0.0019 0.0020 0.0030 0.0029 0.0011 0.00114 0.0019
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We have found statistically signiﬁcant relationships with performance only for
three of the SPGI sub-indices. However, this does not mean that all of the underlying
governance mechanisms have no inﬂuence on performance. On the other hand, sig-
niﬁcant SPGI sub-indices are likely to include constituents that do not explain per-
formance. To get a better understanding, we investigate the eﬀects of individual
governance mechanisms on the performance of pension funds, measured by the
NVA. For this analysis, we again apply equation (2). Most governance variables are
constructed as dummy variables that take a value of 1 if pension funds comply with
good governance as deﬁned by the SPGI. In Tables 14, 15 and 16, we present only the
regression results for signiﬁcant governance variables.
According to our analysis, the SPGI Organization is not signiﬁcantly related to
pension fund performance. However, for 2 out of 10 organizational governance
variables, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on performance, as shown in Table 14.
Pension funds with a full-time CEO do better according to our analysis. On average,
the impact of the CEO on the NVA is as much as 3.6%. In contrast, the pure exist-
ence of a separate investment committee seems to have no inﬂuence on the
performance. However, wherever the investment committee has the optimum size
and is therefore capable of acting eﬀectively, there is a positive eﬀect on performance.
On the contrary, board size seems to be of little importance. Furthermore, we ﬁnd no
empirical evidence for the recommendation to have external experts in the board of
trustees and in the investment committee.
In the OLS regressions, the sub-index SPGI Target Setting is found to be highly
signiﬁcant independent of the applied performance measure. Therefore, it is not
surprising that 6 of the 16 signiﬁcant governance variables are constituents of the
SPGI Target Setting. As expected, we ﬁnd that clear transparency on the target of
ﬁnancing is of great importance. Pension funds that have clear transparency on the
minimum required return show, on average, a higher performance. Furthermore, the
annual review of the minimum required return also has a positive eﬀect on the per-
formance. Somewhat surprising, however, is the fact that management objectives
seem to be important for the CEO as opposed to the board of trustees. We ﬁnd a
positive eﬀect on performance for functional speciﬁcations and binding objectives for
the CEO. Financial compensation of the board of trustees is a controversial topic in
Switzerland. On the one hand, some authors argue that remunerations may help
attract highly qualiﬁed and experienced individuals. On the other hand, there are
concerns about the integrity of board members who will incidentally not work on
voluntary basis but for the juicy taste of remunerations. We ﬁnd evidence that
such remunerations for members of the board of trustees have a positive impact on
pension fund performance. Unfortunately, we are not able to investigate the eﬀect of
board compensation that is linked to management objectives since none of the
96 pension funds reported such a compensation scheme. Finally, the code of conduct
to prevent themisuse of pension assets seems to have a positive impact on performance.
As shown in Table 15, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on performance for
pension funds with a realistic estimate of the expected return of the investment
strategy. Furthermore, pension funds with tactical ﬂuctuation margins setting the
boundary for tactical asset allocations show on average a higher performance. In
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Table 14. Results from OLS regressions of NVA on diﬀerent governance mechanisms (part I)
Results of OLS regressions of the 2005 and 2006 NVA on diﬀerent governance mechanisms and six additional non-governance-related explaining
variables. The sample consists of 96 Swiss pension funds. Only the signiﬁcant results are reported in the table.
Independent variable
Dependent variable=NVA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant x0.0468 0.0343 x0.0431 x0.0308 x0.0121
Number of investment committee membersf6 0.0114*
CEO 0.0360***
Transparency on the minimum required return 0.0183**
Annual review of the minimum required return 0.0277***
Functional speciﬁcations for the CEO 0.0290***
ADCO x2.8223 x7.2560** x3.9536 x2.4656 x3.1117
AMCO 2.7088 2.2750 2.5656 1.3186 2.6429
SIZE 0.0021 x0.0015 0.0014 0.0003 x0.0011
CORA 0.0571** 0.0582** 0.0588** 0.0670*** 0.0712***
LEFO 0.0009 0.0018 0.0031 0.0063 0.0043
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Table 15. Results from OLS regressions of NVA on diﬀerent governance mechanisms (part II)
Results from OLS regressions of the 2005 and 2006 NVA on diﬀerent governance mechanisms and six additional non-governance-related explaining
variables. The sample consists of 96 Swiss pension funds. Only the signiﬁcant results are reported in the table.
Independent variable
Dependent variable=NVA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.0241 x0.0063 x0.0385 x0.0414 x0.0498
Binding objectives for the CEO 0.0166*
Financial compensation of the board of
trustees
0.0140*
Code of conduct implemented 0.0232***
Realistic estimate of the expected return of the
investment strategy
0.0312***
Tactical ﬂuctuation margins 0.0434***
ADCO x6.1286 x5.5497 x3.8324 x3.6262 x4.4829
AMCO 2.4857 3.0544 2.9011 3.7404 2.2531
SIZE x0.0016 0.0002 0.0013 0.0006 0.0003
CORA 0.0597** 0.0583** 0.0521** 0.0597*** 0.0626**
LEFO 0.0051 x0.0024 0.0017 0.0019 0.0063
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Table 16. Results from OLS regressions of NVA on diﬀerent governance mechanisms (part III)
Results from OLS regressions of the 2005 and 2006 NVA on diﬀerent governance mechanisms and six additional non-governance-related explaining
variables. The sample consists of 96 Swiss pension funds. Only the signiﬁcant results are reported in the table.
Independent variable
Dependent variable=NVA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.0503 x0.0973 x0.0190 x0.0041 x0.0301
Application of Article 59 of the OOB2 x0.0329*
Pivotal investment process elements covered
by the investment regulations
0.0268***
Information concept 0.0169**
Intervention guidelines (violations of
the tactical ﬂuctuation margins)
0.0143*
Intervention guidelines (deterioration
of the funding ratio)
0.0178***
ADCO x8.5372* x3.3274 x3.5503 x3.2772 x2.8301
AMCO 0.7610 2.6517 2.0126 1.5681 2.2753
SIZE 0.0001 0.0013 0.0006 0.0001 0.0012
CORA 0.0497** 0.0571*** 0.0576** 0.0592** 0.0629***
LEFO x0.0008 0.0052 0.0037 0.0044 0.0044
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contrast, the remaining six governance mechanisms ensuring that the investment
strategy is aligned with the target of ﬁnancing and the risk-taking capacity of the fund
seem to have no signiﬁcant impact on the value creation of pension funds. This is a
rather surprising result given that most authors argue that this is the key requirement
for a good governed pension fund. It should be kept in mind, however, that we
investigate the relation between governance and performance. In contrast, our in-
vestigation does not encompass the safety aspect.Many governance variables included
in the SPGI are more important for the safety of the retirement income than for the
performance of the pension fund. Finally, the application of Article 59 of the OOB2
seems to have an impact on performance. However, we ﬁnd a negative impact on
performance, implying that pension funds, which make use of the possibilities of
expanding the investment universe, show on average a lower level of value creation.
As our analysis shows, investment organization is an important element of pension
fund governance. However, only 1 of 4 constituents29 of the SPGI Investment Rules
and Organization has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on performance. Pension funds, which
have all pivotal elements of the investment process covered by their investment regu-
lations, show on average a higher performance.
The SPGI Controlling and Steering contributes the most points to the overall
governance index. However, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact on performance only for
three controlling governance variables. It seems to be of high importance that pen-
sion funds govern information collection, processing and distribution. For pension
funds that have an information concept, we ﬁnd a higher performance. In contrast,
the information frequency seems to be less important. Regular compliance checks
and deviation analyses seem to have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on performance. This cor-
responds to the ﬁndings of Mitchell and Hsin (1994) and Useem and Mitchell (2000)
who do not ﬁnd a link between performance reviews and investment returns of
pension funds. Surprisingly, the meeting frequency of the board and of the invest-
ment committee seems to have no eﬀect on pension fund performance. In contrast,
intervention guidelines both for violations of the ﬂuctuation margins and in the
case of a signiﬁcant deterioration of the funding ratio are positively related to per-
formance.
Similar to the SPGI Communication, none of the communication governance
variables shows a signiﬁcant impact on performance according to our analysis.
7 Conclusion
We investigate the relationship between pension fund governance and performance.
For this purpose, we attempt to deﬁne a standard metric that captures the governance
quality of Swiss pension funds. Given the large variety of pension funds in
Switzerland, it is clear that there is no universal solution that ﬁts all. Nevertheless, we
believe that pension funds do have commonalities and believe therefore that certain
standards must exist. The empirical analysis of individual governance mechanisms
may provide initial indications on how to improve our initial proposal.
29 The relation between the existence of investment regulations and performance cannot be investigated
since all pension funds in the sample report to have investment regulations.
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Our results support the widespread hypothesis of a positive relationship between
pension fund governance and investment performance. Given our performance
measure, good governance with respect to target setting and investment strategy
seems to be of particular importance. In contrast, organization, investment rules and
organization, controlling and steering, and communication are not signiﬁcantly re-
lated to performance. However, this does not mean that governance issues in these
areas are negligible. On the one hand, our index is likely to cover not all important
aspects of pension fund governance. For example, the SPGI does not cover soft
factors. On the other hand, pension fund governance should not only be aimed at
increasing value creation and performance. The safety of the retirement income and
mitigation of operational and reputational risks are other important objectives of
pension fund governance.
Even though we conﬁne ourselves to deﬁned bounds, in the investigation of the
relation between pension fund governance and performance, we identify important
elements of good pension fund governance. We ﬁnd evidence that pension funds
should have a full-time CEO. Increasing complexity of the pension system and fast
moving capital markets seem to require a further step away from the traditional
militia system in Switzerland. Management objectives and ﬁnancial compensation of
the board also imply a further professionalization of the pension system in
Switzerland. Looking at the governance variables that have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
performance, we conclude that size seems to be a real constraint on governance. Over
the long term, it is arguable that pension fund should seek ways of sharing resources
or merging into larger entities.
On average, we ﬁnd no indications of serious governance issues of Swiss pension
funds. However, a few pension funds in the sample, in particular small- and medium-
sized funds, show some serious weaknesses in their governance such as inadequate
transparency on the target of ﬁnancing. We hold the views that all pension funds
in Switzerland should comply with certain minimum standards of governance.
A broadly accepted pension fund governance index might be a feasible way of setting
such a standard.
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Appendix
Table A1. Benchmark indices by asset class
Overview of benchmark indices by asset class used to estimate the expected return of the 2006
investment strategy.
Asset class Benchmark index
Cash 3-month CHF LIBOR
Bonds
Domestic Swiss Bond Index
International Lehman Global Aggregate
Stocks
Domestic Swiss Performance Index
International MSCI World
Real estate
Domestic direct KGAST Real Estate Index
Domestic collective SWX Real Estate Mutual Funds Index
International collective FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Global
Mortgages Swiss Mortgage Index
Private equity LPX Composite
Hedge funds HFRI Fund Weighted Composite Index
Table A2. Risk and return of benchmark indices by asset class
Risk, return and reference period of the benchmark indices by asset class.
Benchmark index Reference period Return Volatility
3-month CHF LIBOR 96–06 1.53% 0.9%
Swiss Bond Index 96–06 3.77% 2.59%
Lehman Global Aggregate 96–06 5.86% 6.94%
Swiss Performance Index 96–06 10.75% 16.83%
MSCI World 96–06 8.80% 18.19%
KGAST Real Estate Index 97–06 4.56% 1.46%
SWX Real Estate Mutual Funds Index 96–06 5.20% 7.13%
FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Global 96–06 13.90% 17.00%
Swiss Mortgage Index 02–06 3.27% 2.28%
LPX Composite 02–06 11.37% 18.01%
HFRI Fund Weighted Comp. 96–06 11.44% 13.22%
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